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KEY FEDERAL TAX CASES DECIDED BY
THE COURTS IN 1967
LESTER R. URETZ*
Chief Counsel for the Internal Revenue Service
In the estate tax area, the cases of the Second National Bank of New
Haven, Exr. v. United States and Commissioner v. Estate of Herman J.
Bosch,1 decided June 5, 1967, reached the Supreme Court because of a
widespread conflict among the circuits. 2 The question presented in these
cases was whether a Federal court or agency in a Federal estate tax con-
troversy is conclusively bound by a state trial court adjudication of prop-
erty rights or characterization of property interests when the United States
was not a party to such proceeding. This is an issue which had plagued
the Internal Revenue Service and taxpayers for years.
The facts in Bosch best illustrate the problem. There the decedent
created a revocable inter vivos trust, under the terms of which the income
was to be paid to his wife for life. She had a general power to appoint
the trust corpus by her will. Five and one-half years before the decedent's
death, in an effort to prevent the trust corpus from being taxed as part
of her estate, the wife executed an instrument which purported to release
her general power of appointment and convert it into a special power of
appointment.
When the decedent died, his estate claimed a marital deduction for the
value of the inter vivos trust. But, as the wife had only a special power
of appointment instead of a general power of appointment, the Internal
Revenue Service took the position that the inter vivos trust did not qualify
for the marital deduction.
The decedent's estate filed a petition in the Tax Court. While the Tax
Court proceeding was pending, the decedent's executor-trustee filed a
petition in the New York State Supreme Court, the lowest state court of
original jurisdiction, seeking a determination of the validity of the widow's
release.
Three briefs were filed in the state court action: One for the trustee, one
for the wife, and one by a guardian ad litem on behalf of a minor. All
three briefs argued that the release was a nullity. Since no argument to
*The author expresses his appreciation for the aid in preparing this paper
provided by George N. Watson of the Refund Litigation Division.
1. 387 U.S. 456 (1967).
2. See Gallagher v. Smith, 223 F. 2d 218 (3rd Cir. 1955); Faulkerson's Estate
v. United States, 301 F. 2d 231 (7th Cir. 1962), cert. den. 371 U.S. 887 (1962);
Pierpont v. Commissioner, 336 F. 2d 277 (4th Cir. 1964), cert. den. 380 U.S.
908 (1965). See also the dissenting opinion of Circuit Judge Friendly in Com-
missioner v. Estate of Herman J. Bosch, 363 F. 2d 1009 (2nd Cir. 1966).
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the contrary was presented to the state court, it adopted the unanimous
position of the parties that the release was a nullity.
The Tax Court accepted the state court determination without exam-
ing New York law.' The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld
the Tax Court's decision, concluding that the judgment of the New York
Supreme Court-which was rendered by a court having jurisdiction over
the parties and subject matter-authoritatively settled the rights of the
parties, not only for New York, but also for purposes of the Federal es-
tate tax law, and thus there was no occasion for the court to inquire into
the general law of the state.4
Previously, another panel of the Second Circuit, in Second National,
had concluded that decrees of the Connecticut Probate Court are not
binding and conclusive upon a Federal court in construing and applying
the Federal tax laws, noting that under Connecticut law the Probate
Court's decisions are not binding on the state's higher courts and are even
subject to collateral attack in another probate district.5
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Clark, with Justices
Harlan, Fortas and Douglas dissenting, held that where the Federal es-
tate tax liability turns upon the character of a property interest held and
transferred by the decedent under state law, Federal authorities are not
bound by the determination made of such property interests by a state
trial court.
The Court noted that at least three positions had emerged among the
Circuits. First, if the question at issue is fairly presented to the state court
for its independent decision and is so decided by the court, the resulting
judgment, if binding upon the parties under the state law, is conclusive
as to their property rights in a Federal tax case.6 Second, the Federal court
will consider itself bound by a state court decree only after independent
examination of the state law as determined by the highest court of the
state.' Third, the one the Government primarily urged in the Supreme
Court, a state trial court adjudication is binding in such cases only when
the judgment is the result of an adversary proceeding in the state court.
3. 43 T.C. 120 (1964).
4. Commissioner v. Estate of Herman J. Bosch, supra, note 2
5. 351 F. 2d 489 (2nd Cir. 1965).
6. Gallagher v. Smith, supra, note 2. This is the position that was taken by the
Second Circuit in its Bosch decision.
7. Faulkerson's Estate v. United States, supra, note 2. The Government alterna-
tively took this position, being the so-called Erie R. Co. v. Thompkins, 304 U.S.
64 (1936) approach, to the effect that Congress intended the Federal Courts,
faced with a tax case turning on a question of state law, to determine state law
in accordance with the Rules of Decisions Act and Erie v. Tompkins.
8. Pierpont v. Commissioner, supra, note 2.
TAX CONFERENCE
The Supreme Court noted that the Commissioner was not made a party
to either of the proceedings and neither had the effect of res judicata nor
did collateral estoppel apply, that both state proceedings were brought
for the purpose of directly affecting Federal estate tax liability, and that
it was passing on a Federal taxing statute enacted by the Congress and
therefore the legislative history surrounding the Federal statute must be
examined. The Court stated that Congress intended the marital deduction
to be strictly contrued and applied by providing that only proper regard
was to be accorded state decrees and by placing limitations on the al-
lowance of the deduction, and that this was in keeping with the long-
established policy of the Congress, as expressed in the Rules of Decision
Act.9 This Act provides that in the absence of Federal requirements, such
as the Contitution or Acts of Congress, the laws of the several states are to
be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United
States in cases where they apply. The Supreme Court noted that it has
held that judicial decisions are laws of the state within the Act.10
The Court concluded that when the application of a Federal statute is
involved, the decision of a state trial court as to an underlying issue of
state law should not be controlling, and pointed out that this was but an
application of the rule of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins,"1 where state law as
announced by the highest court of the state is to be followed. The Court
noted that the State's highest court is the best authority on its own law,
and if there is no decision by that court, then Federal authority must ap-
ply what it finds to be the state law, after giving proper regard to relevant
rulings of other courts of the State.
In a post-Second National and Bosch decision, the District Court for
the Eastern District of Tennessee in the case of 1. M. Underwood v.
United States1' concluded that a judgment of the County Court of
Anderson County fixing the compensation of the trustees at eight per-
cent when the will provided that the fee should not exceed five percent
was not binding on the District Court. The District Court upon its own
interpretation of state law concluded that the rule in Tennessee forbids
a court from allowing compensation to trustees in excess of the amount
fixed in the will and thus limited the Federal estate tax deduction to five
percent.
In a recent decision handed down on September 6, 1967, by the Dis-
trict Court for the District of South Carolina, in the case of Lakewood
9. 28 U.S.C. §1652.
10. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, supra, note 7; Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp.,
337 U.S. 541 (1949); King v. Order of Travelers, 333 U.S. 153 (1948).
11. supra, note 7.
12. 270 F. Supp. 389 (E. D. Tenn. 1967).
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Plantation, Inc. v. United States,"3 the question presented concerned the
admissibility of a certain state trial court decree affecting the federal taxes
at issue. The District Court concluded that the state court decree in ques-
tion and all evidence of the state court proceeding with respect to the is-
sues involved in the case at bar was inadmissible in the federal tax suit. In
this case, by deed dated in 1953, V. F. Platt, Sr., transferred certain tim-
berlands in fee to a newly formed corporation, Lakewood Plantation, Inc.
During the period 1954 through 1957, certain sales of timber were made
by Lakewood. Other sales of timber were made, but purportedly by Mr.
Platt. The income from these sales was reported by Mr. Platt on his
personal tax return and was not reported as income by Lakewood. In
1957, the Internal Revenue Service concluded that the income received
under all of the timber sales agreements was taxable to Lakewood, and
none to Mr. Platt. Subsequently a correction deed dated in 1953, but
recorded in 1957, was executed wherein the timber on the transferred
property was reserved to Mr. Platt for 20 years. It was uncontradicted
that the deed was prepared in 1957 and backdated to 1953.
In 1959 a civil action was commenced in the Court of Common Pleas
for Horry County, South Carolina, by Mr. Platt against Lakewood
Plantation Inc., and others to reform the original deed ab initio to
reflect that a mutual mistake had been made therein-that is, that Mr.
Platt had intended to reserve to himself for 20 years the timber and other
mineral rights on the property. The Federal Government was not a
party to this reformation suit. In a decree dated March 26, 1960, it
was ordered that the reformation be effective as of the date of the
original deed.
The District Court stated that the validity of the decree of reformation
issued by the Court of Common Pleas hinged primarily on a disputed
factual question rather than upon the application or misapplication of
South Carolina law. The court held that if the Government, in ac-
cordance with the Supreme Court's decision in Second National and
Bosch, is not bound by a state trial court decree of property rights based
on a misapplication of state law, it is also not bound by a decree based
on erroneous findings of fact. Accordingly, the court concluded that the
state decree in question had no binding force on the Government in the
Federal tax case.
It is somewhat unusual for the Supreme Court to review two estate
tax problems at the same time. In addition to Second National and
Bosch, the case of Northeastern Pennsylvania National Bank & Trust
Co. v. United States,1 was decided May 22, 1967, by the Supreme Court.
13. _... F. Supp-...(D. S. Car. 1967); 67-2 USTC 973.
14. 387 U.S. 213 (1967).
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It reached the Supreme Court because of a conflict between the Third
Circuit's decision in the instant case" and the decision of the Seventh
Circuit in United States v. Citizens National Bank of Evansville.16 The
question presented was whether a bequest in trust providing for a
monthly payment to the decedent's widow of a fixed amount can qualify
for the estate tax marital deduction under section 2056(b) (5) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954. The Internal Revenue Service took the
position that the trust did not qualify for the marital deduction because
the widow's right to the income of the trust was expressed as a "fixed
amount" rather than as a "fractional or percentile share" of the total
trust income as the regulations required.17 The Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit agreed. The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Mr.
Justice Fortas, with Justices Stewart, Black and Harlan dissenting, re-
versed the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
The marital deduction provisions of the Code were enacted by Congress
in 1948 to equalize the effect of estate taxes in community property and
common law states. In community property states a decedent's estate
includes only one-half of the community property, and the widow's
estate the other half. The marital deduction allows the transfer of up to
one-half of noncommunity property to the surviving spouse free of the
estate tax.
Northeastern involved a testamentary trust which provided the widow
with the power to appoint by her will the entire corpus of the trust to
her estate or named individuals. In addition, she was to receive out of
the trust income and corpus, if necessary, the sum of $300 per month.
The Government argued that since she was not entitled to all of the
"income from a specific portion" of the trust corpus, the marital de-
duction provision did not apply. The Government urged that the intent
of the Act of 1948 was to the effect that an interest in property be-
queathed to a widow must be equivalent to outright ownership in order
to qualify for the marital deduction. The Government argued that the
statutory requirement that the widow receive "income from a specific
portion" is but an extension of this reasoning and that under the regu-
lations in question the "specific portion" must be expressed in the trust
as "a fractional or percentile share."
The Court concluded that the regulations improperly restrict the
scope of the marital deduction, noting that there was no indication in
the legislative history from which one could conclude that Congress
15. 363 F. 2d 476 (3rd Cir. 1966).
16. 359 F. 2d 817 (7th Cir. 1966).
17. Section 20.2056 (b)-5(c).
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intended that the deduction would be defeated because the "specific
portion" or "individual part" was not expressed by the testator in terms
of a "fractional or percentile share." The Court stated that Congress did
not intend the deduction to be available only with respect to an interest
equivalent to outright ownership.
As to the computation of the "specific portion," the Court stated that
it should not be a difficult matter to settle on a rate of return available
to a trustee under reasonable investment conditions which could be used
to compute the "specific portion" of the corpus whose income is equal
to the monthly stipend provided for in the trust. The Court rejected
the annuity-valuation approach to compute the "specific portion," and
stated that the question is "to determine the amount of the corpus re-
quired to produce the fixed monthly stipend, not to compute the present
value of the right to monthly payments over an actuarially computed
life expectancy." 18 Accordingly, the Supreme Court remanded the case
to the District Court to make the determination. 1'
Turning away from the estate tax area let us focus on section 162 (a) (2)
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, which provides that a taxpayer
may deduct "traveling expenses (including amounts expended for meals
and lodging ** *) while away from home in the pursuit of a trade or
business * * *." The interpretation of this provision, particularly the
phrase "while away from home," has given rise to much litigation, and
was the subject of two Supreme Court cases decided in 1967.
In the first of these cases, Commissioner v. Howe A. Stidger,20 de-
cided March 20, 1967, the Court considered the question of what con-
stitutes the tax home of the military man whose assigned post of duty is
at one location and whose family residence is at another.
Prior to October 1956, Stidger, a Captain in the Marine Corps,
was assigned to a base in California, and he lived nearby with his wife
and children. However, in October 1957, he was transferred to a base
in Japan to serve a standard 15-month tour of duty. Since military per-
sonnel were not allowed to bring their dependents to Japan, Captain
Stidger left his wife and children at his residence in California, where
they stayed the entire time while he was in Japan.
On his 1958 tax return, Captain Stidger deducted the cost of his
meals while in Japan. The Internal Revenue Service, however, took the
position that his duty base in Japan represented his principal place of
business and thus his tax home. Therefore, it disallowed his meal costs
18. 387 U.s. at 225.
19. supra, note 14.
20. 386 U.S. 287 (1967).
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while there on the ground that he was not traveling away from home.
The Tax Court upheld the Service, 2 but the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the word "home," as used in the
statute, has to be given its usual meaning as the place of residence of
the taxpayer and his family, and not his place of business. - 2 In so hold-
ing, the Ninth Circuit created a direct conflict with a 1948 decision of
the Fourth Circuit.2 3 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
The Supreme Court noted at the outset that its decision of the case
had to rest squarely on a determination of where was the taxpayer's tax
home. In the two prior cases involving travel expense deductions which
the Court had decided, questions of location of tax home had been
argued to the Court, but it had decided the cases on different grounds.
The first such case was Commissioner v. Flowers,24 decided in 1946, in-
volving a lawyer who worked in one city but for reasons of personal
preference lived in another. The Court simply held that because the
taxpayer lived in a city distant from where he worked for personal
reasons, his travel expenses were not ordinary and necessary expenses.
Therefore, it never reached the question of whether he was traveling
away from home. The other travel expense case the Supreme Court had
considered before Stidger was Peurifoy v. Commissioner,2 5 decided in
1958. There it simply affirmed, per curiam, a holding of the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit that certain employment of the tax-
payers involved was indefinite rather than temporary in nature, thereby
making their places of employment their tax home. The Supreme Court
placed its affirmance on the ground that the Fourth Circuit's finding of
indefinite rather than temporary employment represented a fair assess-
ment of the record. Therefore, the Supreme Court did not examine the
merits of the case, and it did not consider the question of the meaning of
the word "home" as used in the statute.
Since military dependents were not permitted in Japan, Captain
Stidger's choice to maintain his family residence at a place other than
where he worked was not made for personal reasons, as had been true
in the Flowers case. There was therefore no question that Stidger's
traveling expenses were "ordinary and necessary" within the meaning
of section 162. Thus, the Supreme Court for the first time squarely faced
the issue of what constituted a taxpayer's tax home.
21. 40 T.C. 896 (1963).
22. 355 F. 2d 294 (9th Cir. 1966).
23. Bercaw v. Commissioner, 165 F. 2d 521 (4th Cir. 1948).
24. 326 U.S. 465 (1946).
25. 358 U.S. 59 (1958).
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In an opinion by Chief Justice Warren, with Justices Douglas, Black
and Fortas dissenting, the Court held that Stidger's tax home was his
duty station in Japan and not his family residence in California.
The Court considered first the Government's argument that the In-
ternal Revenue Service's position that a taxpayer's "home" is located
at his principal place of business has the effect of law because Congress
has repeatedly reenacted the substance of section 162 of the Code
with knowledge of the Service's interpretation. In support of this argu-
ment the Government pointed out that a provision allowing the de-
duction of travel expenses while away from home was first enacted in
the Revenue Act of 1921.26 Rulings published in 1921 held in effect
that "home" as used in the statute meant a taxpayer's principal place of
business or employment, whether or not it coincided with his place
of residence.2 7 The Service has adhered to that position, with certain
refinements, ever since, in both published rulings and litigation. Congress
has reenacted the travel expense provision, without change in substance,
in every revenue act subsequent to 1921, and in the 1939 and 1954
Codes.
Moreover, the Internal Revenue Service's position that home means
principal place of business was brought to the attention of Congress
with particular force in 1936 when the Commissioner argued in a case
before the Board of Tax Appeals that a Congressman's tax home was
Washington, D. C., even if he maintained a permanent residence in
the district from which he was elected. The Board of Tax Appeals,
agreeing with the Commissioner, held that a Congressman could not de-
duct his meals and lodging expenses in Washington because while there
he was not away from home.2 8
In 1952 Congress amended the Code in order to negate the effects
of this decision. It added a provision stating that the home of a Member
of Congress shall be considered his place of residence within the state or
district he represents, but amounts expended by Congressmen for living
expenses shall not be deductible in excess of $3,000 per year.2 9
The Government urged in Stidger that by taking this course of action
in response to the holding of the Board of Tax Appeals, Congress in-
plicitly gave approval to the Internal Revenue Service's general position
that a taxpayer's "home" is located at his principal place of business.
This is because Congress could have amended the travel expense section
of the Code in such a way as to overturn that position entirely, but
26. Section 214(a) (1) of the Revenue Act of 1921, 42 Stat. 239.
27. O.D. 864, C.B. 4, 211 (1921) ; O.D. 1021, C.B. 5, 174 (1921).
28. Lindsay v. Commissioner, 34 B.T.A. 840 (1936).
29. Section 162(a).
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instead of doing so, it merely enacted a very limited amendment bearing
only upon the cases of the Congressmen themselves.
The Court in Stidger rested its decision in a large part upon reasoning
relevant only to members of the military services. The Court held, first,
that military statutes and regulations supported the Commissioner's
position that a military man's tax home is his permanent duty station.
It observed that a Marine Corps directive defined the length of standard
tours of duty in terms of the commencement and termination dates of
"permanent changes of station." In addition, eligibility for certain
statutory travel allowances turns upon whether an assignment constitutes
a "change of permanent station" or whether the serviceman is "away
from his designated post of duty," and not, it should be noted, whether
he is away from his permanent residence or legal domicile.
The Court went on to hold that the Service's position as to the military
man's tax home found additional support in the fact that Congress
traditionally has provided a special system of tax-free allowances for
military personnel. In line with these allowances Stidger received per
diem payments while he was away from his permanent duty station in
Japan. His quarters at that station were provided to him free, and at
the same time he received a tax-free quarters allowance, and also a
tax-free subsistence allowance. Moreover, because his assignment to
Japan was considered a change of permanent station, the Government
would have paid the moving expenses of Stidger's wife and children
had they moved their residence from California to another part of the
United States. The Court noted that the system of tax-free allowances
gives military men complete and direct relief from the special living
expenses imposed upon them by their vocation, whereas the income tax
deduction under section 162 of the Code accords only incomplete and
indirect relief to the civilian business traveler.
In addition to the foregoing observations, the Supreme Court took
note that the Service had long maintained the position that the military
man's permanent post of duty was his tax home, and its position had
previously been upheld in a Court of Appeals decision.80 The Court
stated that Congress had thus long had knowledge of the Service's in-
terpretation of the statute, and had chosen to deal with the financial
problems of military life by way of a special system of tax-free allow-
ances for servicemen. The Court concluded that for these reasons it
agreed with the Service's position that the tax home of the serviceman
is his permanent duty station, even if he is not able to bring his family
there to live with him.
30. Bercaw v. Commissioner, supra, note 23.
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The Court thus upheld the Service's definition of "home" as applied
to the military taxpayer, thereby settling one of the controversial ques-
tions presented in the travel expense field.
The second travel expense problem which the Supreme Court con-
sidered in 1967 is that of determining when a taxpayer is away from his
tax home. The Internal Revenue Service has long taken the position
that an individual is not away from home unless he is away long
enough so as to be required to obtain substantial sleep or rest.31 In most
cases where the business traveler meets this requirement, he does so
because his trip requires him to stay away from home overnight. The
Service's definition of "away from home" is therefore commonly known
as the "overnight rule."
Decisions of the lower courts have been sharply divided over the
issue of whether the overnight rule is a valid interpretation of the statute.
The Tax Court consistently upheld the rule between 1944 and 1966 in
numerous cases dealing with meal expenses. However, in 1962 the Eighth
Circuit rejected the rule in Hanson v. Commissioner, stating that it is
"merely an arbitrary line drawing having no basis in the statute," and
that "these cases must be decided according to their own set of facts.132
In 1966 the Tax Court followed the Eighth Circuit's decision, announcing
in William A. Bagley v. Commissioner that it would no longer follow the
overnight rule as an absolute guide in all cases.3 3 The First Circuit, how-
ever, reversed the Tax Court's decision in Bagley, holding that the
language in section 162 refers to travel in a substantial sense, and not
to one-day round trips. It stated that it could think of no sharper or
better place to draw the line in defining "away from home" than does
the overnight rule, and that it would therefore accept the rule.3 4 Mr.
Bagley, a consulting engineer, maintained his office at his home in Mill.
ford, New Hampshire. During 1960 and 1961 he was employed from
time to time by various power companies in the New England area on a
per diem basis. On many of these days he left home early, ate break-
fast on the way, ate lunch at work, and stopped to dine on the drive
back. His employers' places of business were from 30 to 75 miles away
and he normally reached home about 10 p.m. The First Circuit deter-
mined that Mr. Bagley could not deduct the cost of these meals.
Meanwhile the Sixth Circuit had rejected the overnight rules in Cor-
31. Rev. Rul. 63-239, C.B. 1963-2, 87.
32. 298 F. 2d 391, 397 (8th Cir. 1962). Accord, United States v. Moralan, 356
F. 2d 199 (8th Cir. 1966).
33. 46 T.C. 176 (1966).
34. 374 F. 2d at 207.
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rell v. United States." There a wholesale food salesman made daily
round trips on behalf of his employer to various towns and cities around
the town where he resided. He generally left his residence at 5 a.m. and
returned around 5:30 p.m., covering about 150 to 175 miles per day.
The question presented is whether the cost of his breakfasts and lunches
while on the road constitute deductible traveling expenses or non-
deductible personal or living expenses. The Government determined that
his meal expenses were not deductible because his trips were of less than
overnight duration, and he was therefore not away from his tax home.
The Sixth Circuit held that the Commisioner's "overnight" or "sleep or
rest" rule bore no rational relationship to the business necessity of the
meal expenses.
Thus, the Eighth and Sixth Circuits, having rejected the rule, were
arrayed against the First Circuit, which had upheld it. In the 1966 term
of the Supreme Court, certiorari was applied for in both Bagley and Cor-
rell. Certiorari was granted in Correll, and the case was decided on De-
cember 11, 1967.36
In an opinion by Justice Stewart, with Justices Douglas, Black and
Fortas dissenting, and Justice Marshal not participating, the overnight
rule was upheld by the Court. The Court stated that the overnight rule
provides a means of interpreting the travel expense statute so as to
achieve ease and certainty of application, and substantial fairness to tax-
payers.
The rule affords ease and certainty of application by providing a def-
inite and objective standard for deciding cases. Without the rule, the
question of whether a particular taxpayer was "away from home" on a
given day would presumably have to be decided on a case-by-case basis,
and much uncertainty and wasteful litigation would result. As the First
Circuit put it in the Bagley case, "every meal-purchasing taxpayer"
would have "to take pot luck in the courts."3 7
The overnight rule achieves substantial fairness to taxpayers by putting
all one-day travelers on a similar tax footing. Without the rule, a tax-
payer who leaves his home city on a one-day trip would be allowed to
deduct the cost of his lunch and other meals consumed on the trip,
whereas a taxpayer who merely commutes or travels within a city is not
allowed to deduct the cost of his lunch or any other meals which he pur-
chases.
The Court further held that the overnight rule was not inconsistent
35. 369 F. 2d 87 (6th Cir. 1966).
36. _... U.S.....(1967) ; 68-1 USTC 9101.
37. 374 F. 2d at 207.
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with the wording of the travel expense statute. Observing that the lan.
guage of the statute--"meals and lodging.., away from home"-is ob
viously not self-defining, it stated that the use of the words "meals and
lodging," as a unit, suggests-at least arguably-that Congress con.
templated a deduction for the cost of meals only where the travel in
question involves lodging as well as meals. Since only the taxpayer who
must stop for sleep or rest on his business trip incurs significantly higher
living expenses as a direct result of his business travel, Congress might
well have thought that only taxpayers in this category should be allowed
to deduct their living costs while on the road.
The Court noted that in any event it was clear that when Congress
enacted section 162(a) (2) as part of the 1954 Code, it had notice that
the Commissioner had interpreted its statutory predecessor in accordance
with the overnight rule. The various committee reports and hearings
show that the rule was brought to the attention of, and was understood
by, the committees involved. The Court held that the case thus came
within the well-settled principle that Treasury regulations and interpre.
tations long continued without substantial change, applying to unamended
or substantially reenacted statutes, are deemed to have received congres-
sional approval and have the effect of law.
The Court stated that while alternatives to the overnight rule were
available, and improvements could be imagined, the Court's role was
only to assure that the Commissioner's regulations fall within his authority
to implement the congressional mandate in some reasonable manner. It
concluded that the rule had not been shown deficient on that score and
was therefore valid.
As a result of the Correll decision, the uncertainty which existed for
many years concerning the validity of the overnight rule is at an end, and
the sharp conflict which the rule engendered among the courts has been
put to rest. There can be little doubt that Correll is a landmark decision
in the travel expense area, and will do much toward bringing order and
coherence to a field of tax law which in the past has been the scene
of much confusion.
Turning to section 482 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,8 am
important decision involving pricing arrangements based upon valid
business reasons was rendered by the United States Court of Claims on
38. Section 482 provides that in any case of two or more organizations, trades,
or businesses owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the same interests, the
Secretary or his delegate may distribute, apportion, or allocate gross income, etc.,
between or among such organizations, etc., if he determines that such distributi02
etc., is necessary in order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the
income of any such organizations.
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February 17, 1967, in the case of Eli Lilly and Company v. United
States. 9 The taxpayer, an Indiana corporation, is a long-established and
well-known manufacturer of ethical drugs40 and also engages in extensive
research and development of new drugs for manufacture. It sells its
products to domestic customers within the United States. Prior to 1943
the taxpayer exported its products; however, in 1943 the taxpayer decided
to handle its export business through subsidiary corporations. It formed
Eli Lilly International Corporation and Eli Lilly Pan-American Corpora-
tion, both of which are wholly owned Indiana corporations. Pan-
American obtained a ruling from the Internal Revenue Service in early
1944 that it qualified as a Western Hemisphere Trade Corporation. The
advantage of this ruling was that Pan-American was taxable at the max-
imum rate of 38 percent, whereas Eli Lilly and International were taxable
at the rate of 52 percent. In 1944 Eli Lilly adopted a pricing policy on its
sales to International and Pan-American designed to motivate these sub-
sidiaries to increase their volume of export sales. It sold to its subsidiaries
at a very substantial discount off domestic prices, increasing the discount
with the volume of sales. In 1946 the taxpayer decided to change its sales
flow. Thereafter, instead of selling directly to both International and
Pan-American, the taxpayer sold all merchandise for export to Inter-
national. International, in turn, sold either to its customers in the Eastern
Hemisphere or to Pan-American. Pan-American, in turn, sold to its cus-
tomers in the Western Hemisphere.
In 1952 the taxpayer again decided to change its pricing policy. In
that year prices were demoralized in the antibotic field and streptomycin
was being purchased by taxpayer and sold at a loss because of its dif-
ficulties in manufacturing that product. Also, the taxpayer had a con-
tinuing tax problem under section 45 of the Internal Revenue Code of
1939 (the predecessor of section 482 of the 1954 Code), since the then
existing pricing arrangement, arising from the settlement of the Internal
Revenue Service's proposed assessment under section 45 of the 1939 Code
for the years 1944 through 1948, allegedly placed the taxpayer at a sub-
stantial disadvantage tax-wise with respect to the rest of the industry.
The new pricing arrangements were intended to approximate the tax-
payer's manufacturing costs, plus third-party royalties and allocated oper-
ating expenses. Thus, the taxpayer established a pricing policy in 1952
which differed from the policy which it had used in 1944 through 1948.
The pricing arrangement which had been in effect for the period 1944
39. 372 F. 2d 990 (Ct. Cs. 1967).
40. "Ethical" drugs, generally speaking, are those which can be purchased by
the consumer only on prescription.
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through 1948 had been a discount off domestic prices, the discount in-
creasing as the subsidiaries' volume of sales increased. The pricing
policy established in 1952 was a cost-oriented price which, in effect,
allocated all the profits to the taxpayer's subsidiaries. Under this new
pricing policy all goods transferred to International were priced at ap-
proximately manufacturing cost. However, International's pricing policies
for goods purchased by it from the taxpayer differed with respect to goods
destined for its customers in the Eastern Hemisphere as compared to those
destined for Pan-American. International sold to its customers in the
Eastern Hemisphere at approximately the same price as Eli Lilly sold to
its domestic customers. However, International sold to Pan-American at a
price designed only to recover International's cost, plus allocable adminis-
trative and selling expenses attributable to sales to Pan-American. As in
the case of sales by Eli Lilly to International, no provision was made for
any substantial profit to International on its sales to Pan-American. In
short, by its pricing policy the taxpayer shifted its own profits to its tax-
favored subsidiary-Pan American.
Lilly contended that the legal standard to be applied in employing sec-
tion 482 is that of a fair and reasonable price and that the prices it
charged International for goods sold to it met this standard and therefore
no reallocation was necessary. The Government contended that section
482 authorizes the Commissioner to reallocate income wherever necessary
to reflect the true income of controlled corporations-whether the failure
to reflect true income resulted from inadvertence, tax avoidance, design,
or from sound internal business reasons, such as inter-company bookkeep-
ing, incentives, or capitalization-and that the standard established in the
Income Tax Regulations" for the application of section 482 is that deal-
ing which would have taken place at arm's length between independent
taxpayers if circumstances were otherwise unchanged.
The Court of Claims determined that Eli Lilly failed to prove that the
Internal Revenue Service arrived at an unreasonable result. The court
noted that after the reallocation under section 482 Pan-American's share
of the profits was still high and ranged from 62.07 percent to 74.56 per-
cent, and thus the lion's share of the profits from Western Hemisphere
sales remained in Pan-American even after the reallocation. The court
applied the provision of section 1.482-1 of the regulations and stated that
if International were an "uncontrolled" purchaser from Eli Lilly, it would
not have been able to buy the products at the prices paid by it in this
case. The court concluded that Eli Lilly failed to meet its admittedly
difficult burden of proving what it would have charged a volume pur-
41. Section 1.482-1(b) (1).
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chaser, such as International, if it were an "uncontrolled" purchaser. The
court stated that in a refund suit the taxpayer in order to prevail must
go further than proving arbitrary action by the Commissioner. That, in
addition, the taxpayer must provide the correct amount of the tax and
resulting overpayment.
The court noted that the existence of valid and sound business purposes
for inter-company arrangements does not devitalize section 482, noting
that the shift resulted in a failure to clearly reflect Eli Lilly's income from
manufacturing, and that this is enough to warrant an allocation under
section 482.
As to the arm's length standard, the court cited from Oil Base, Inc. v.
Commissioner,'2 to the effect that "where * ** the extent of the income
in question is largely determined by the terms of business transactions en-
tered into between two controlled corporations it is not unreasonable to
construe 'true' taxable income as that which would have resulted if the
tranactions had taken place upon such terms as would have applied had
the dealings been at arm's length between unrelated parties,"' 3 and con-
cluded that even if the arm's-length standard is not the sole criterion, it
is certainly the most significant yardstick.
Lilly further contended that section 482 should not be applied to an
inter-company pricing arrangement so as to deny any of the benefits in-
tended to be conferred by the Code on Western Hemisphere Trade Cor-
porations. The court concluded that section 482 is available to the Gov-
ernment even though the resulting reallocation may have an effect on
some benefits conferred by another section of the Code, and thus the
Commissioner was authorized to apply the provisions of section 482 despite
the resulting impact on some of the benefits conferred by the Western
Hemisphere Trade Corporation provisions of the Code.
An important decision in the realm of exempt organizations was
rendered by the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit on June 21, 1967,
in the case of Crosby Valve and Gage Company v. Commissioner.4 In
this case the issue presented was whether the assignment of a corporation's
equity in certain bonds to an exempt organization, which owned all of
the stock of the taxpayer-corporation, constituted a charitable contribu-
tion so as to entitle the taxpayer to a deduction under section 170 of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
The taxpayer is a Massachusetts corporation, all of whose stock is
owned by the Stone Charitable Foundation, Inc., an organization de-
42. 362 F. 2d 212 (9th Cir. 1966).
43. supra, note 42 at 214.
44. 380 F. 2d 146 (Ist Cir. 1967).
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scribed in section 501(c) (3). The taxpayer purchased certain, bonds,
which were financed in part by bank loans, held the bonds for 30 days or
more, and then contributed them to the Foundation subject to the bank
loans. Charitable deductions were claimed by the taxpayer-corporation
on its returns filed for the fiscal years 1954, 1955 and 1956, and were
based on the contributions of the taxpayer's equity in the bonds assigned
to the Foundation.
The Government contended that the assignments of the taxpayer's
equity in the bonds to the Foundation were not charitable contributions
such as would entitle the taxpayer to deductions under section 170, but
were in fact dividends to its parent. This contention was based on the
fact that the Foundation owns all of the stock of the taxpayer and com-
pletely controls its operations, and that such control precludes the assign.
ments from qualifying as gifts. The Tax Court held for the Government
concluding that the transfers did not proceed from a detached and dis-
interested generosity, but were the result primarily of the control which
the Foundation had over the taxpayer and the legal duty which the tax-
payer had to carry out the will of its sole stockholder.'" The Tax Court
cited and relied upon the Supreme Court decision in Commissioner v.
Duberstcin.'6 The Tax Court stated that their conclusion was consistent
with the legislative purpose of the sections of the Code relating to the
taxation of unrelated business income of certain exempt organizations.'"
The taxpayer appealed and in an opinion by Circuit Judge Coffin the
First Circuit agreed with the conclusion reached by the Tax Court, but
registered disagreement with the Tax Court's emphasis upon a purely
charitable motive as a prerequisite for a deductible charitable contribution.
The court stated that were the deductibility of a contribution under sec-
tion 170(c) to depend on "detached and disinterested generosity, an im-
portant area of tax law would become a mare's nest of uncertainty woven
of judicial value judgments irrelevent to eleemosynary reality."' 8 The
court stated that in the case of a contribution to a charitable organization,
the law's policy finds charity in the purposes and works of the qualifying
organization, not in the subjective intent of the contributor. However, the
First Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's decision on the alternative ground
for the Tax Court's decision, that being, that there is no reason for a
difference in tax treatment merely because the income was earned by a
wholly owned subsidiary rather than directly by the tax-exempt organiza-
tion. The First Circuit relied on the statutory treatment of the taxation
45. 46 T.C. 641 (1966).
46. 363 U.S. 278 (1960).
47. Sections 511 to 515, I.R.C. 1954.
48. supra, note 44 at 146.
TAX CONFERENCE
of unrelated business income of certain charitable organizations. It stated
that whether the charity operates a business directly or through a sub-
sidiary, the economic and competitive implications of allowing a deduction
for income that in fact is retained by the charity would be the same, and
thus the transfer must be treated as a nondeductible dividend under
section 316.
The decision in Crosby Valve was followed by the Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit in the case of United States v. Knapp Brothers Shoe
Manufacturing Corporation, decided November 2, 1967. In this case
three individuals interested in New York University, an exempt organiza-
tion, formed the taxpayer-corporation. The certificate of incorporation
provided that "no stockholder shall at any time be entitled to dividends
on his shares; ... [or] to any of the profits or assets . . ." The sole dis-
tributee of both income and property was NYU. Upon its formation the
taxpayer acquired all of the assets of Knapp Brothers, Inc., a successful
shoe manufacturer. The business continued to be profitable and during
the years 1957 through 1960 the taxpayer made substantial payments to
NYU. The question presented was whether these payments constituted
charitable contribution. The court stated that the question was whether
the taxpayer could escape the ambit of the Crosby Valve case.
The taxpayer contended that NYU was neither "owner" nor "share-
holder" and that the Crosby Valve rationale was therefore inapplicable,
asserting that the owners of taxpayer were the voting trustees, who, under
the voting trust instruments, are vested with both legal and beneficial
ownership of the Stock. The court disagreed, stating that it is NYU which
possesses the real beneficial interest and that the stockholders neither
have, nor can have, any interest or purpose apart from the ultimate in-
terest of NYU.
The taxpayer next contended that NYU may never receive any funds
from it, the stockholders may retain all profits in the company, and the
company, instead of succeeding, may go bankrupt. The court answered
this contention by stating that the possibility that no one will benefit from
the operations of the taxpayer does not alter the fact that if any profits
do become payable, they are payable to NYU.
In conclusion, the court remarked that good citizenship and charitable
giving are good business, but charity that begins at home, however
amiable, is not within that concept.
49. 384 F. 2d 692 (lst Cir. 1967).

